Objections

The strongest attacks on Cor, and where it stands on each.

Work is built on top of Cor, so the strongest attacks on its whole approach belong on the record, next to the claims they hit. Each entry below states the attack at full strength, in the attacker's own words, with the source. It names the parts of the atlas the attack hits, says where Cor stands, and gives a verdict.

The verdicts mean this. Answered: Cor holds evidence that meets the attack. Partly answered: some of it is met and the rest is open. Open: Cor does not hold the evidence to meet it, and the entry says what is missing. Conceded: the attack is right, and the entry says what follows. An attack whose source could not be read in full gets no verdict. Recording an objection changes no position in the atlas. Answers cite only records that are in Cor; replies published by others are attributed to their authors.

Register as of 13 November 2026 23 objections: 1 answered, 13 partly answered, 4 open, 5 conceded.
Index

Every objection on record.

Evolutionary psychology

Attacks on the evolutionary approach itself.

These target evolutionary psychology as a field. Each one reaches Cor because Cor reads human signals against an ancestral baseline (P2, P3).

OBJ-01 The matching problem: nobody can show today's mechanisms are the ancestral ones

Verdict: Partly answered

The attack

To explain a present-day mental mechanism by evolution, you have to show three things: that it matches a mechanism selected for in the ancestral environment, that it descends from that mechanism, and that it still does the same job. The tools biologists use for this (experiments, comparison with related species, fossils, optimality models) are mostly unavailable for human psychology. Smith concludes that evolutionary psychology as it stands is impossible. Maung applies the same argument to evolutionary psychiatry, mismatch accounts included: the data cannot decide whether a disorder is a breakdown, a mismatch, a persisting adaptation, a by-product, or simply a product of development in a modern setting, and reading ancestral function off modern symptoms is circular.

"Evolutionary psychological claims, therefore, fail unless practitioners can show that mental structures underpinning present-day behaviors are structures that evolved in prehistory for the performance of adaptive tasks that it is still their function to perform. This is the matching problem."

Subrena E. Smith (2020), "Why Evolutionary Psychology (Probably) Isn't Possible", This View of Life, source, paragraph 9. Not a Cor record: a web essay with no DOI. It restates the argument of Smith's paper (Biological Theory, 2020, ext 1067), which is closed access and is in Cor from its abstract only.

"If there is no fact of the matter about how psychological mechanisms are to be individuated, then there is no fact of the matter about how they are to be matched."

Subrena E. Smith (2020), "Why Evolutionary Psychology (Probably) Isn't Possible", This View of Life, source, paragraph 11. Not a Cor record: as above.

"However, for many mental disorders, evolutionary psychiatry lacks the methodological resources to demonstrate these conditions. Therefore, many evolutionary psychiatry hypotheses are empirically untestable and remain indefinitely underdetermined by data."

"This results in circular reasoning, whereby the properties of modern minds are assumed to have also been possessed by ancient minds and then these assumed properties of ancient minds are invoked to explain the properties of modern minds, without any independent evidence that ancient minds actually possessed these properties"

Where it hits

P2 P3 DA1 OF2 C2 C3 C13

Where Cor stands

For the old affective systems the attack is met the way it is met in animal biology. Descent and conserved function are shown by comparison across species: the subcortical systems behind fear, seeking, separation distress, care, play and lust are conserved across mammals (C4, DA8, Jaak Panksepp and Lucy Biven 2012, ext 8). Cor's mismatch claim then needs only that the cues a mechanism responds to still vary today, so its response can be tested now. That is Cor's resolution-condition logic, and it is the same move Egeland and colleagues make in reply.

Three parts stay open. First, the human-specific systems: cooperation and norm enforcement (M11) has no foundational parent (C11), and Smith's point lands hardest there. Second, Smith's individuation point is not answered: Cor's count of fifteen mechanisms is a choice of grain (threat management merges fear and rage, social bonding includes grief), and nothing in Cor fixes that count as a fact. Third, Maung's point about shared mechanisms: that inflammation and sympathetic arousal are conserved does not show whether a given case of low mood or anxiety is a mismatch response, a breakdown or a developmental product. Cor files cases without a marker as signals by a stated rule (DA1), and that rule is a stated decision with no empirical grade. Cor holds no test that tells a mismatch reading apart from a developmental-only reading of the same disorder.

Replies published by others

Egeland, Kennair and Kleppestø (2026) reply that the routes biologists use to support homology in animals are open to evolutionary psychology too, so Smith's bar would also sink animal behaviour research (Egeland J et al. 2026, ext 1068); that a mechanism needs continuity only in its own input conditions (Egeland J et al. 2026, ext 1069); and that the amygdala and disgust meet the standard Smith accepts for the corneal reflex (Egeland J et al. 2026, ext 1070). They also concede that the evidence leaves competing hypotheses underdetermined (Egeland J et al. 2026, ext 1071). Their replies do not address individuation, and they postdate Maung without answering him separately. Hagen (2020) replied to Smith on This View of Life; that reply is not yet read for Cor.

What would settle it

Per mechanism: comparative evidence that its circuit is homologous across related species, which Cor holds for the conserved systems and lacks for the human-specific ones. For disorder readings: a test where the two accounts predict different things. A mismatch reading predicts the signal tracks current input and fades when the resolution condition is supplied, in adults too. A developmental-only reading predicts the response is fixed by early history and changes little when present input changes.

On record in Cor: G10 (only 5 of 15 mechanisms forced), G6, falsifier 1 on the research programme page.

OBJ-02 Distinctively human thinking is learned from culture, not inherited

Verdict: Partly answered

The attack

Heyes argues that the mechanisms that make human thinking distinctive (imitation, mindreading, language, selective social learning) get their design from cultural evolution. Each person builds them during development with general learning abilities, from information other people supply, the way literacy is built. On this view humans are not stuck with Stone Age minds: human nature changes over historical time.

"Cognitive Gadgets opens up a third way. It suggests that distinctively human cognitive mechanisms are adaptive because they are shaped primarily, not by nature or nurture, but by culture."

Heyes C (2019), Précis of Cognitive Gadgets: The Cultural Evolution of Thinking, doi:10.1017/S0140525X18002145, Section 9, final paragraph, ext 1073

"On a broader scale, cultural evolutionary psychology implies that human minds are more agile, but also more fragile, than was previously thought. We are not stuck in the Pleistocene past with Stone Age minds"

Heyes C (2019), Précis of Cognitive Gadgets: The Cultural Evolution of Thinking, doi:10.1017/S0140525X18002145, Section 9, 'Human nature', ext 1074

Where it hits

P2 DA7 M11 M4

Where Cor stands

Heyes limits her own attack. She leaves emotion, motivation, social motivation and attention to genetic evolution, as a starter kit shared in large part with other apes (Heyes C 2019, ext 1075). Cor's mechanisms are motivational-emotional systems, the part she places in that kit, so most of the atlas sits outside her target. Cor also already holds that a matched setting includes cultural scaffolding (P3, G7) and records cultural evolution as a force on human psychology (Henrich and Joseph 2016, ext 120).

The exposed parts are the cognitive pieces inside two mechanisms: cheater detection and norm enforcement in M11, which Cor grounds partly in Cosmides and Tooby's case for specialised social-exchange reasoning (Jerome H. Barkow et al. 1992, ext 297), and learning social rules through play in M4. If those capacities are cultural gadgets, the resolution conditions Cor writes for them describe a learned skill, and a missing skill is a different kind of mismatch from a missing input.

Replies published by others

Egeland and colleagues (2026) grant that learned design, with reading as the case, shows design can appear without inherited homology (Egeland J et al. 2026, ext 1071). The open peer commentaries on Heyes's précis in Behavioral and Brain Sciences are not yet read for Cor.

What would settle it

Heyes's own test (Heyes C 2019, ext 1076): compare what a mechanism can do with how much usable information the developmental setting supplies. Applied to the cheater-detection and norm-enforcement parts of M11, too little information points to inherited design; enough points to learning or culture.

On record in Cor: C11 (no foundational parent), G7.

OBJ-03 Development builds the mind, so there are no pre-set programs to mismatch

Verdict: Partly answered

The attack

Genes cannot specify brain wiring in detail. Development, epigenetic marks, learning and the physical and social setting build the mind in each lifetime, and separating causes into fixed genes and variable environment cannot be defended. Buller adds the sharpest version for a mismatch account: the same genes developing in a new environment can produce different psychological traits, so there is no reason to think every evolved trait is still the trait our ancestors had.

"From this viewpoint, the human mind does not consist of pre-specified programmes, but is built via a constant interplay between the individual and its environment"

Bolhuis JJ et al. (2011), Darwin in Mind: New Opportunities for Evolutionary Psychology, doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001109, Reassessing the Major Tenets: Universalism, para 4, ext 1084

"Simply put, human capacities are neither genetically nor environmentally specified, but emerge within processes of development"

Narvaez D et al. (2022), Evolving evolutionary psychology, doi:10.1037/amp0000849, Pillar I: NEP and the Conceptual Agenda of Neo-Darwinism, ext 1088

"Any Pleistocene-selected genes we possess will interact with these new environments to produce psychological traits that may differ in important ways from those of our Pleistocene ancestors. So there is no good reason to think that all of our evolved psychological characteristics remain adapted to the lifestyle of Pleistocene hunter-gatherers."

Where it hits

P2 DA7 DA10 C12

Where Cor stands

Most of this attack is aimed at a genetic determinism Cor does not hold. Cor's architecture calibrates to developmental input within evolved ranges (DA7, C12), with evidence from cross-fostering in rats that reverses epigenetic programming (Weaver ICG et al. 2004, ext 99), from Bowlby on behavioural systems whose adult form depends on rearing (John Bowlby 1969, ext 13), and from the dose-response of childhood adversity (Felitti VJ et al. 1998, ext 53). Narvaez and colleagues' own positive programme, a mammalian developmental niche used as the baseline for species-typical development, is close to Cor's and is recorded as support (Narvaez D et al. 2022, ext 1092).

Buller's version is not met. If modern development builds a different mechanism, then the claim that the hardware works and only the input is wrong becomes a hypothesis to test per mechanism. Cor's frame already allows for it: developmental miscalibration displaces the plain signal reading (OF2). What Cor does not hold is evidence, mechanism by mechanism, that the adult system built in a modern setting still responds to its resolution condition.

Replies published by others

Egeland and colleagues (2026, Table 2) give the field's standard reply: evolutionary psychology holds that every mechanism develops through gene-environment interaction, and that the processes the critics name are not neglected.

What would settle it

Reversibility in adults raised in mismatched settings: when the resolution condition is supplied, does the signal fade? Cor holds some of this for controllability, where experience of control protects against later passivity in rats (Maier SF and Seligman MEP 2016, ext 69), and lacks it for most mechanisms.

On record in Cor: Developmental miscalibration in OF2; G6.

OBJ-04 Adaptation keeps up: recent selection and niche construction

Verdict: Partly answered

The attack

Human genetic evolution sped up in the last 80,000 years, and selection in many species can shift a trait within a few hundred years. Humans also build their own environments to suit their adaptations and fix self-made problems with culture. Together these predict much less lag between human design and the modern world than evolutionary psychology assumes, and they undercut the picture of a Stone Age mind in a modern world.

"If humans exhibit equivalent rates, then significant genetic evolution would occur over the course of a few hundred years. While fast evolution is far from inevitable, there is nonetheless strong evidence that it has frequently occurred in humans. EP has yet to come to terms with the possibility of recent, rapid genetic changes with their potential for associated neural rewiring."

Bolhuis JJ et al. (2011), Darwin in Mind: New Opportunities for Evolutionary Psychology, doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001109, Reassessing the Major Tenets: The Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness and Gradualism, para 3, ext 1081

"The rate of adaptive evolution in human populations has indeed accelerated within the past 80,000 years. The results above demonstrate the extent of acceleration: the recent rate must be one to two orders of magnitude higher than the long-term rate to explain the genomewide pattern."

Hawks J et al. (2007), Recent acceleration of human adaptive evolution, doi:10.1073/pnas.0707650104, Results: Population Growth, para 1, ext 1093

"While adaptiveness is far from guaranteed, from this theoretical perspective humans are expected to experience far less adaptive lag than anticipated by EP"

Bolhuis JJ et al. (2011), Darwin in Mind: New Opportunities for Evolutionary Psychology, doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001109, Towards a New Science of the Evolution of the Mind, point (ii), ext 1083

"The idea that we are stuck with a Pleistocene-adapted psychology greatly underestimates the rate at which natural and sexual selection can drive evolutionary change."

Where it hits

P3 C3 DA8 M8 M13

Cor itself holds the claim this attacks: Eaton and Konner's statement that the human genome has changed little since agriculture (Eaton SB and Konner M 1985, ext 38).

Where Cor stands

Recent selection is real, and the clearest examples fall in Cor's own territory: disease resistance and diet (Hawks J et al. 2007, ext 1094), which bear on immune regulation (M8) and energy regulation (M13). Cor has no evidence on whether selection in the last 10,000 years changed the circuits behind its other mechanisms. Hawks and colleagues measure genes and say nothing about psychology; the step from their result to minds is Bolhuis and colleagues' inference.

Two things limit the attack. Most of Cor's mismatch readings rest on systems conserved across mammals (C4), where a few hundred generations of change would have to rewrite function shared with rats and monkeys. And the settings Cor calls most mismatched (artificial light at night, feeds, ultra-processed food, isolated housing) are one to five generations old, faster than even the fast selection rates Bolhuis cites. Niche construction cuts both ways: people build settings to suit themselves, and markets build settings to exploit unmet needs (DC2). Which force wins is an empirical question per parameter.

Replies published by others

None found in what was read. Egeland and colleagues (2026, Table 2) list recent Holocene selection under the human-nature objection and reply that the same species-typical mechanisms produce different behaviour in different ecologies.

What would settle it

Genome scans showing Holocene selection on genes for the circuits Cor names (opioid, oxytocin, stress-axis, circadian) would weaken the conserved-system defence for those mechanisms. Per parameter: evidence that a modern setting has existed long enough, and pressed hard enough on fitness, for selection to act.

On record in Cor: Proposal only: a caveat on ext 38 pointing to ext 1093.

OBJ-05 There was no single ancestral environment

Verdict: Partly answered

The attack

The environment of evolutionary adaptedness is not one place or time. The Pleistocene climate swung and its pattern of swings kept changing; early humans lived in many habitats; different traits arose at different times, under different conditions; and later settled farming life may itself be part of human evolutionary history. Buller adds that the adaptive problems that shaped the mind are mostly unknowable, because the evidence about ancestral social life is lost.

"Reference to the chronological and phylogenetic context for the evolution of human behaviour shows that the EEA is by no means unitary. Different elements have different time depths, and by implication different mechanisms."

Foley RA (1996), An evolutionary and chronological framework for human social behaviour, ISBN 9780197261644, Section 'The EEA and the chronology of human social evolution', pp. 110-111, ext 1109

"Even if we consider the selection pressures that acted on ancestral human populations during the Pleistocene epoch (approximately 1.7 million to 10,000 years ago), the abstract concept of stable selection pressures in the EEA is challenged by recent evidence from paleoecology and paleoanthropology."

Bolhuis JJ et al. (2011), Darwin in Mind: New Opportunities for Evolutionary Psychology, doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001109, Reassessing the Major Tenets: The Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness and Gradualism, para 4, ext 1082

"these descriptions are purely speculative because we have little evidence of the conditions under which early human evolution occurred. The paleontological record provides a few clues about some aspects of early human life, but it is largely silent regarding the social interactions that would have been of principal importance in human psychological evolution."

Where it hits

P3 C3 DA8

Where Cor stands

Cor already defines a matched setting as one within the range humans have lived in, often culturally scaffolded, and explicitly not an ancestral surface form (P3). It records that this criterion is not sharp (G7), and it holds evidence that late Pleistocene social life varied more than the egalitarian-band picture (Singh M and Glowacki L 2022, ext 756, background tier). Foley's point that different elements have different time depths fits Cor's frame: each system's baseline is the period it was shaped in, and the old affective systems predate the Pleistocene altogether (DA8, C4).

Buller's point stands for the parameters that depend on ancestral social detail (group size, care arrangements, status structure). For those, Cor leans on living foragers, and living foragers are a sample of recent human variation and show the deep past only indirectly. The public copy often says "the EEA" in the singular, which overstates what Cor holds.

Replies published by others

None found in what was read.

What would settle it

For each mechanism, a stated time depth and the observed range of its input conditions across that period, which is the sharper criterion G7 asks for. Parameters whose range rests only on living foragers should say so.

On record in Cor: G7; Foley (1995) is in Cor from its opening paragraph only (Foley R 1995, ext 1111, background tier).

OBJ-06 There is no universal human nature to be mismatched

Verdict: Partly answered

The attack

Cultural variation shapes psychological traits, human populations differ genetically partly through recent selection, and so there is no uniform human genetic program. Buller argues that evolutionary psychology's doctrine of a universal human nature is one of the reasons its celebrated findings have not held up.

"From this perspective, cultural practices are likely to have influenced selection pressures on the human brain, raising the possibility that genetic variation could lead to biases in the human cognitive processing between, as well as within, populations. In summary, there is no uniform human genetic program."

Bolhuis JJ et al. (2011), Darwin in Mind: New Opportunities for Evolutionary Psychology, doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001109, Reassessing the Major Tenets: Universalism, para 6, ext 1085

"Evolutionary Psychology’s failure to produce solid empirical discoveries, I suggest, stems from problems with its theoretical framework"

Where it hits

P2 DA10 M14 M5

Where Cor stands

Cor claims species-typical mechanisms whose settings vary between individuals within heritable ranges (DA10, C15), and it builds cultural scaffolding into what counts as matched (P3). For the conserved affective core this meets the attack.

It is not met for the sex-differentiated claims in reproductive motivation (M14). Cor holds the counter-evidence: stated mate preferences barely predict actual choices (Eastwick PW et al. 2014, ext 757, background tier), the jealousy sex difference shrinks outside forced-choice questions (Harris CR 2003, ext 758, background tier), and sex differences in mate preferences shrink in nations with more gender parity (Zentner M and Mitura K 2012, ext 1009, background tier). Cor's own gap record says cross-cultural tests of these claims are thin (G2). Differences between populations from recent selection are outside what DA10 covers.

Replies published by others

Egeland and colleagues (2026, Table 2) reply that many universal adaptations remain under cultural variation and that the same mechanisms produce different behaviour in different ecologies.

What would settle it

Cross-cultural tests of the specific M14 claims in small-scale societies, with behaviour measured directly rather than stated preference.

On record in Cor: G2; challenge records Wood W and Eagly AH 2002, ext 805, background tier, Zentner M and Mitura K 2012, ext 1009, background tier.

OBJ-07 Just-so stories: an adaptive story is always available, so the account cannot fail

Verdict: Partly answered

The attack

Gould and Lewontin argue that adaptive explanations cannot be refuted in practice: when one story fails, another replaces it, and plausibility is taken as proof. A good fit between organism and environment does not show selection made it; drift, by-products of development and later reuse of parts can all produce fit. They would object far less if an adaptive explanation could be rejected after failing an explicit test.

"Since the range of adaptive stories is as wide as our minds are fertile, new stories can always be postulated."

Gould SJ and Lewontin RC (1979), The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme, doi:10.1098/rspb.1979.0086, Section 3, Telling stories, p. 587, ext 1099

"Often, evolutionists use consistency with natural selection as the sole criterion and consider their work done when they concoct a plausible story. But plausible stories can always be told."

Gould SJ and Lewontin RC (1979), The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme, doi:10.1098/rspb.1979.0086, Section 3, Telling stories, pp. 587-588, ext 1100

"We would not object so strenuously to the adaptationist programme if its invocation, in any particular case, could lead in principle to its rejection for want of evidence."

Gould SJ and Lewontin RC (1979), The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme, doi:10.1098/rspb.1979.0086, Section 3, Telling stories, p. 587, ext 1102

Where it hits

P1 P2 DA1 OF2

Where Cor stands

Cor's grading rule answers part of this. A mismatch reading is graded by whether its modern prediction was tested and held, and the grade covers the tested prediction, never the ancestral story behind it. The research programme lists six results that would refute Cor. Cor also records by-product readings as challenges, for example that music may have no adaptive function (Pinker S 1997, ext 807, background tier).

Two points are conceded. The research programme's second hard-core claim says every drive, emotion and preference exists because it once helped propagate the genes that built it; that is the strong adaptationism Gould and Lewontin attack, and it leaves no room for by-products or drift in particular traits. And the signal default (OF2) supplies a ready reading for any distress without a marker, which is the pattern of an explanation that cannot fail. Falsifier 2's wording ("weakened, not refuted") protects the core in the same way.

Replies published by others

Egeland and colleagues (2026, Table 2) reply that adaptationist explanations are offered only for traits with evidence of functional design, and that many hypotheses in the field generate testable predictions, some of which have been falsified.

What would settle it

For each mismatch reading, a modern prediction written down before the data are in, which could fail. Proposal only: restate hard-core claim 2 at the level of motivational architecture as a whole, leaving room for by-products and drift in particular traits, and state what would refute falsifier 2's claim outright.

On record in Cor: Falsifiers 2 and 6 on the research programme page.

OBJ-08 Values read into evolution: "what a human needs" smuggles in a norm

Verdict: Partly answered

The attack

Egeland and colleagues charge Narvaez and colleagues with the moralistic fallacy for saying natural selection requires thriving. Unless thriving just means differential fitness, it has nothing to do with selection: evolution is amoral and indifferent to human ideas of the good. The same charge reaches any account that moves from what selection built to what people should have.

"However, unless “thriving” is understood reductively, for example in terms of differential fitness, its relation to natural selection is orthogonal. Evolution is an amoral process that operates by forces unconcerned with human notions of what is good or right"

Egeland J et al. (2026), Explaining Human Psychology Evolutionarily: Recent Criticisms and New Lines of Defense, doi:10.1007/s12110-026-09540-1, Neglected Processes of Evolutionary Change, final paragraph, ext 1072

Where it hits

P1 OF2 DA9 DC3

Where Cor stands

Cor separates fitness from what is good for the organism: inclusive fitness is the loss function of selection, not of the organism's computation (P1). In Cor, a need is a resolution condition, the input that ends a signal, which is a descriptive claim. The ancestral baseline is used to diagnose a gap; it is not offered as a prescription or as the good life.

Cor's applied claims do take a further step. "The fix is the input", the medication line, and the matched-versus-mismatched axis for AI systems all assume that chronic unresolved signals are worth ending. That is a value premise, and Cor does not state it anywhere as a premise.

Replies published by others

Egeland and colleagues (2026, Table 2) reply to the related charge of unethical implications that it commits either the naturalistic or the moralistic fallacy, because facts about what is do not fix what ought to be.

What would settle it

This is settled by a stated premise, not by data: name the value the applied layer uses (for example, people's own reflective preference that their alarms resolve). Evidence that matched settings raise wellbeing as people themselves report it would then test the applied claims, which is falsifier 3 run in reverse.

On record in Cor: Proposal only: add the value premise to the application layer.

OBJ-09 "Modular", "general-purpose" and "domain-sensitive" mix levels of analysis

Verdict: Conceded

The attack

Pietraszewski and Wertz, themselves evolutionary psychologists, argue that the forty-year debate over modular versus general-purpose minds is confused. Fodor's modules are defined by what lies outside a central self's control; evolutionary psychology's are defined by function. Mixing the two levels makes the debate ill-posed, and the unmarked word "modularity" should be dropped. Bolhuis and colleagues add that domain-general learning mechanisms plainly exist across species.

"In this article we argue that the entirety of this debate, and the very notion of massive modularity itself, is ill-posed and confused. In particular, it is based on a confusion about the level of analysis (or reduction) at which one is approaching the mind."

Pietraszewski D and Wertz AE (2022), Why Evolutionary Psychology Should Abandon Modularity, doi:10.1177/1745691621997113, Abstract, ext 1096

"Given the profound confusion created by the term “modularity,” we would suggest abandoning any unmarked use of the term going forward."

Pietraszewski D and Wertz AE (2022), Why Evolutionary Psychology Should Abandon Modularity, doi:10.1177/1745691621997113, Moving Beyond the Modularity Mistake, para 2, ext 1098

"Firstly, comparative psychology presents an unassailable case for the existence of domain-general mechanisms."

Bolhuis JJ et al. (2011), Darwin in Mind: New Opportunities for Evolutionary Psychology, doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001109, Reassessing the Major Tenets: Massive Modularity, para 2, ext 1086

Where it hits

P2 C2 M2 M6

Where Cor stands

Cor's premise survives at the functional level: Pietraszewski and Wertz hold domain specificity coherent there, and Cor defines each mechanism by the adaptive problem it answers (P2). The wording is conceded. C2 defines the architecture as domain-sensitive "rather than a general-purpose learner", and the research programme's third hard-core claim says "not modular and not general-purpose"; both are the unmarked binning the paper says to drop. Cor is also inconsistent with itself: the record for M2 describes it as a "general-purpose seeking system", and controllability learning in M6 uses the kind of general mechanism Bolhuis describes.

Replies published by others

Egeland and colleagues (2026, Table 2) note that proponents differ: some hold adaptations must be domain-specific, others accept relatively domain-general mechanisms within the framework.

What would settle it

Already settled for the wording. Proposal only: restate C2 and hard-core claim 3 at the functional level (mechanisms individuated by the problem they solve, interacting, sharing substrate), and remove "general-purpose" from the M2 description or explain the difference.

On record in Cor: Proposal only, no node edited.

OBJ-10 Setting evolved, automatic systems against a flexible, thinking part is a level error

Verdict: Open

The attack

Pietraszewski and Wertz argue that any framing in which evolution is set against flexibility, rationality or conscious deliberation is always a mistake of levels. At the level of function, every process, slow and deliberate ones included, is produced by evolved mechanisms; "evolved" is not a name for the rigid part of the mind.

"Any theoretical framing in which evolution is pitted against flexibility, rationality, or conscious deliberation is invariably an example of approaching claims about evolved cognitive processes through the lens of the intentional level of analysis"

Pietraszewski D and Wertz AE (2022), Why Evolutionary Psychology Should Abandon Modularity, doi:10.1177/1745691621997113, The Consequences of the Modularity Mistake: Misunderstanding evolutionary psychology through the lens of an intentional level of analysis, para 2, ext 1097

Where it hits

DC3 DA8 M1 M6

This lands on Cor's phylogenetic-depth principle: old brainstem and limbic systems cannot learn that a proxy is fake, newer cortical systems can override them at a cost, and mismatch is worst where the targeted circuit is oldest.

Where Cor stands

Cor states the override claim at the level of brain circuits, which the paper treats as a valid level: the prefrontal pathway that overrides default passivity (Maier SF and Seligman MEP 2016, ext 69), the threat-detection circuit as distinct from conscious fear (LeDoux JE 2014, ext 546), and chronic stress remodelling the brain regions that regulate it (McEwen et al. 2012, ext 129). That defends DC3 as an implementation claim.

The depth principle as Cor writes it goes further: it sorts systems into ones that cannot learn and ones that can, by evolutionary age. That is the framing the paper calls a level error, and Cor holds no test of its central prediction, that the severity of a mismatch tracks the age of the circuit it targets.

Replies published by others

None found in what was read.

What would settle it

A direct test of the depth principle: in the same people, compare how quickly responses to known-fake cues fade when the cue targets an older circuit versus a newer one. Without it, the principle is a hypothesis and should be labelled as one.

On record in Cor: DC3, DA8.

OBJ-11 The mind as a computer running Pleistocene programs is outdated

Verdict: Answered

The attack

Mainstream cognitive science now takes embodied, embedded, extended and enactive accounts of mind seriously, and even moderate versions reject the computational picture of a brain running Pleistocene programs.

"Even less radical strains of 4E cognition, such as extended conceptualizations of mind, reject the exaggerated, Pleistocene-program version of computationalism to which proponents of NEP continue to adhere"

Narvaez D et al. (2022), Evolving evolutionary psychology, doi:10.1037/amp0000849, Pillar II: The Rise of 4E Cognition, ext 1091

Where it hits

P2

Where Cor stands

This attack targets a picture Cor does not use. Cor speaks of the organism, not the mind: its mechanisms include the immune system, the stress axis and circadian timing, each with bodily input conditions (P2, M7, M8). Its central terms are signals and the inputs that resolve them, which sit comfortably with embodied accounts. Cor makes no claim that the brain runs programs.

Replies published by others

Egeland and colleagues (2026, Table 2) reply that the computational view has produced many discoveries and its rivals have not.

What would settle it

If Cor's mechanism descriptions came to depend on a computational-program claim, this entry would reopen.

OBJ-12 Cheater detection is not shown to be a special mechanism

Verdict: Partly answered

The attack

Buller argues that the two main reasoning-task results cited for a cheater-detection module are equally explained by a mind applying general logical rules, because the social-contract rules in those tasks have a different logical form from the comparison rules.

"Neither result, however, is evidence of a cheater-detection module, for both results are compatible with a nonmodular mind that reasons with general logical principles."

Buller DJ (2005), Evolutionary psychology: the emperor's new paradigm, doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.04.003, Section 'The results prove nothing', p. 278, ext 1108

Where it hits

M11 C11

Where Cor stands

Cor's cooperation mechanism (M11) uses Cosmides and Tooby's case for specialised social-exchange reasoning (Jerome H. Barkow et al. 1992, ext 297), and cheater detection is named in its description. The mechanism does not rest on that case alone: punishment of cheaters at personal cost, and coalitions that keep would-be bullies down in forager bands (Christopher Boehm 1999, ext 371), are separate lines of evidence for reciprocity and norm enforcement. The convergence that forces M11 has no foundational parent (C11), so the mechanism already sits on less secure ground than most.

Replies published by others

None found in what was read.

What would settle it

Reasoning tasks that hold logical form constant while varying the social-exchange content, or the reverse.

On record in Cor: C11.

Rival frameworks

Accounts that explain the same data another way.

Each of these offers a different reading of what Cor reads as mismatch signaling.

OBJ-13 Research Domain Criteria: the trouble is dysregulated brain systems

Verdict: Open

The attack

The US research framework RDoC treats mental disorder as deviation along normal-to-abnormal dimensions of basic functional systems, each carried by identified brain circuits, and holds that a neuroscience-based diagnosis will have to explain complex symptoms as dysregulation of basic brain operations.

"First, RDoC adopts a translational approach to disorders, construing (for these experimental purposes) pathology in terms of deviations in fundamental functional systems."

Cuthbert BN (2014), The RDoC framework: facilitating transition from ICD/DSM to dimensional approaches that integrate neuroscience and psychopathology, doi:10.1002/wps.20087, Major postulates of RDoC, ext 1116

"if the field is ever to establish a diagnostic system based upon neuroscience, sooner or later it will be essential to explain complex symptoms in terms of dysregulation in basic brain operations"

Cuthbert BN (2014), The RDoC framework: facilitating transition from ICD/DSM to dimensional approaches that integrate neuroscience and psychopathology, doi:10.1002/wps.20087, Major postulates of RDoC, ext 1117

Where it hits

DA1 OF2

Where Cor stands

Much of RDoC lines up with Cor: its dimensions for threat, reward, social processes and arousal map onto Cor's M1, M2, M3, M5, M7 and M8. The disagreement is where the deviation lives. RDoC places it in the person's circuit function; Cor reads the same deviation as the circuit responding correctly to its input until a marker shows damage (DA1, OF2). Both readings fit the same cross-sectional data, and Cor holds no study that tells them apart.

Replies published by others

None found in what was read.

What would settle it

Follow circuit-level measures over time while inputs change. If deviations normalise when the resolution condition is supplied, Cor's reading wins; if they persist regardless of input, the dysregulation reading wins. RDoC names the same kind of task as its own goal (Cuthbert BN 2014, ext 1118).

OBJ-14 Active inference: low mood as an over-confident expectation, not a reading of the world

Verdict: Partly answered

The attack

Clark, Watson and Friston model mood as the brain's long-run expectation about how predictable its actions' outcomes are. Depression is a confident prediction that outcomes will be uncertain, which then maintains itself and resists revision. Chronic stress or genes can lock the setting so it no longer responds to error signals, and the same faulty computation can arise from different faults in different people, which would explain why no consistent biomarker has been found.

"Depression occurs when an uncertain, unpredictable outcome is predicted with high precision (red lines) resulting in a chronic, self-maintaining negative emotional state that is resistant to revision."

Clark JE et al. (2018), What is mood? A computational perspective, doi:10.1017/S0033291718000430, When mood goes wrong, Figure 1 legend, ext 1119

"This means the set-point of neuromodulator systems becomes configured to an aberrant tonic drive that is resistant to negative feedback loops that relay error messages"

"no single neuromodulator system will be implicated in every patient; possibly reflecting the vast number of treatment-resistant patients and the failure to find a consistent biomarker."

Where it hits

OF2 DA1 DA3 M6

Where Cor stands

The account agrees with Cor about the way in: a volatile, stressful environment lowers mood, and the authors call that lowering an adaptive response (Clark JE et al. 2018, ext 1122). That is Cor's reading of controllability (M6). Where they part, Cor has a slot for the locked state: coupled systems can keep a response running after its trigger has passed (DA3), and chronic dysregulation displaces the plain signal reading (OF2).

What Cor lacks is any estimate of how often low mood sits in that self-maintaining state rather than reading current input. If most cases are locked, the signal default is the wrong starting point for most cases.

Replies published by others

None found in what was read.

What would settle it

The share of low-mood episodes that fade when inputs change versus those that persist after the inputs are fixed. The authors' own proposed mood-induction test under volatile conditions (Clark JE et al. 2018, ext 1122) would test the shared part.

OBJ-15 Addiction neuroscience: drugs change the brain in substance-specific ways

Verdict: Partly answered

The attack

All addictive drugs sharply raise dopamine in reward regions, and repeated use adapts the brain's stress circuitry. On this account addiction is driven by drug-specific changes in the brain. Evolutionary researchers add a second attack: most drug use is not the pathological hijack a mismatch account predicts, and children do not take drugs as readily as the hijack account says they should.

"All known addictive drugs activate reward regions in the brain by causing sharp increases in the release of dopamine."

Volkow ND et al. (2016), Neurobiologic Advances from the Brain Disease Model of Addiction, doi:10.1056/NEJMra1511480, Section on the neurobiology of addiction, first paragraphs, ext 969

"the person with addiction transitions from taking drugs simply to feel pleasure, or to “get high,” to taking them to obtain transient relief from dysphoria"

Volkow ND et al. (2016), Neurobiologic Advances from the Brain Disease Model of Addiction, doi:10.1056/NEJMra1511480, Section on the antireward system and Figure 1, ext 970

"These mundane substances do not have an immediate hedonistic"

Sullivan RJ and Hagen EH (2002), Psychotropic substance-seeking: evolutionary pathology or adaptation?, doi:10.1046/j.1360-0443.2002.00024.x, Section: First experiences of commonly used drugs are often aversive, p. 393, ext 901

Where it hits

DA4 OF2 M2

Where Cor stands

Cor treats this as a genuine challenge, as its FAQ says. A drug's effect on the brain is a measurable physical cause, so Cor's frame puts drug-produced adaptation on the physical side (OF2). Cor also holds evidence pointing the other way: rats trained to take cocaine readily give it up when a sweet alternative is offered (Heilig M et al. 2021, ext 977).

Open: whether vulnerability and relapse are better explained by drug-specific brain change or by unmet needs. Sullivan and Hagen's point that the hijack reading fits only a small share of drug use (Sullivan RJ and Hagen EH 2002, ext 901, Hagen EH et al. 2013, ext 919) stands against Cor's proxy-hijack property (DA4) as applied to drugs. Node changes from the drugs review are awaiting decisions.

Replies published by others

None beyond the records cited.

What would settle it

With access held constant, does drug-specific brain change predict relapse beyond measures of unmet need (isolation, lack of control, lack of alternatives)?

On record in Cor: All drug challenge records sit under M2 and DA4.

Specific to Cor

Attacks on how this atlas is built.

These hit Cor's own method and records. Several are weaknesses Cor already lists in its gap register and FAQ.

OBJ-16 The matched state has no independent measure

Verdict: Open

The attack

If "matched" can only be recognised by the signal going quiet, then saying the signal fires because the setting is mismatched is circular. Maung calls the general form of this the Flintstones fallacy: modern features are assumed for the ancestors and then used to explain the moderns.

"This results in circular reasoning, whereby the properties of modern minds are assumed to have also been possessed by ancient minds and then these assumed properties of ancient minds are invoked to explain the properties of modern minds, without any independent evidence that ancient minds actually possessed these properties"

Where it hits

P3 OF2 DA1

Where Cor stands

Cor's own gap register states this (G6). Resolution conditions exist for each mechanism, some with rough numbers (around five close co-regulators for social bonding, nine to fifteen kilometres of varied daily movement), but none is a validated measure with reliability between raters or over time. Until one exists, a mismatch reading can be read off the signal it is meant to explain.

What would settle it

A measurement protocol for the matched state of each mechanism, scored without reference to the signal, with tested reliability, and then a test of whether it predicts how often the signal fires.

On record in Cor: G6.

OBJ-17 Some signals are faulty: mutation load

Verdict: Conceded

The attack

Keller and Miller argue that common mental disorders with high heritability and real fitness costs are best explained by many rare, mildly harmful mutations. On that model a share of distress comes from faulty construction, carries no single marker, and is not a correct signal of anything.

""

Keller et al. (2006), Resolving the paradox of common, harmful, heritable mental disorders: Which evolutionary genetic models work best?, doi:10.1017/s0140525x06009095, ext 590

Where it hits

DA1 OF2 DA10

Where Cor stands

Cor does not dispute the model. Large-effect genetic variants with measurable physical effects already sit on the disease side (OF2). The many small mutations Keller and Miller describe leave no marker, so the biomarker line (DA1) files those cases as signals. Cor's own record for DA1 lists this as a counterpoint and applies the line anyway. That is a decision with a known cost: some cases Cor reads as signals will be construction faults.

What would settle it

Polygenic or rare-variant scores that pick out a subset of a label with physical effects would move that subset to the disease side under Cor's own rule.

On record in Cor: Keller et al. 2006, ext 594; Nesse's psychotic depression and mania counterpoint is recorded in DA1.

OBJ-18 No known marker does not show there is no physical cause

Verdict: Conceded

The attack

Kendler argues that sorting psychiatric conditions into organic, with a visible brain finding, and functional, without one, is a leftover of nineteenth-century neuropathology and of mind-body dualism. Causes of psychiatric illness are spread across biological, psychological and social levels and act through each other, and depression with a clear trigger carries the same genetic risk as depression without one.

"The approach is fallacious and only makes sense if you assume a Cartesian worldview and you are looking for where to ‘split’ the HMBS."

Kendler KS (2012), The dappled nature of causes of psychiatric illness: replacing the organic-functional/hardware-software dichotomy with empirically based pluralism, doi:10.1038/mp.2011.182, Concerns and comments, ext 1112

"Psychogenic forms of MD (aka ‘reactive’ or ‘situational’) do not differ from ‘non-psychogenic’ forms in their level of familial/genetic risk for MD."

Kendler KS (2012), The dappled nature of causes of psychiatric illness: replacing the organic-functional/hardware-software dichotomy with empirically based pluralism, doi:10.1038/mp.2011.182, Concerns and comments, ext 1113

"Instead, the causes of psychiatric illness are dappled, distributed widely across multiple categories."

Kendler KS (2012), The dappled nature of causes of psychiatric illness: replacing the organic-functional/hardware-software dichotomy with empirically based pluralism, doi:10.1038/mp.2011.182, Abstract; Causal signatures, ext 1114

Where it hits

DA1 OF2

Where Cor stands

The logical point is conceded, and Cor already says so: the biomarker line is a stance that decides which cases Cor calls disease, never an empirical result, and any subset of a label for which a marker is found moves to the physical side (DA1). Kendler's stronger point hits the line itself. Cor's organic-versus-signal split is the kind of split he calls incoherent, and his finding that triggered and untriggered depression share genetic risk cuts against reading the two differently. Cor keeps the line as a stated decision about labels and action. Recording the objection does not move it.

Replies published by others

Kapur, Phillips and Insel (2012) give a related account of why biological differences have not become clinical tests (Kapur S et al. 2012, ext 1115, background tier).

What would settle it

Not by argument. A validated marker for part of a label moves that part, case by case.

On record in Cor: Boundary conditions on the research programme page.

OBJ-19 There is no forager data on how often the signals fire

Verdict: Open

The attack

The mismatch frame predicts that low mood, anxiety and compulsive seeking fire less often and for shorter spells in settings close to the ancestral one. No study measures this.

Where it hits

P3 OF2

Where Cor stands

Cor's research programme already says the signal half of its first falsifier cannot yet be scored. The only depressive-symptom figures come from one Amazonian population, where low mood is common and goes with immune activation, disability and lost roles (Stieglitz J et al. 2015, ext 654). Building any instrument for forager psychopathology runs into translation and construct problems (Scaff C et al. 2025, ext 657). A low-signal forager baseline is an assumption the atlas holds no evidence for.

What would settle it

Experience sampling of signal frequency and duration in a forager or forager-horticulturalist population against an industrial one, with the same method.

On record in Cor: Falsifier 1 on the research programme page.

OBJ-20 The atlas has never been re-run by anyone else

Verdict: Conceded

The attack

One person, working with an AI pipeline, chose the sources, wrote the extractions and set the grades. Nobody has applied the method independently and reported whether they reached the same places.

Where it hits

P2 P3

Where Cor stands

True, and listed on the FAQ as the most consequential weakness. The method is published, sources carry identifiers and verbatim quotes, and the grading rules were written before the gradings, but only one mechanism has coding criteria a second person could execute.

What would settle it

An independent team runs the published method on at least one mechanism and reports agreement.

OBJ-21 Perception is not shown to be tuned to fitness instead of truth

Verdict: Partly answered

The attack

Esposito argues that the evolutionary argument against trusting our faculties defeats itself, and that rescuing it needs a link between fitness and truth that biology cannot establish. Either way the strong claim that perception tracks fitness and never reality is not established.

""

Maurizio Esposito (2025), Darwin's "Horrid" Doubt Revisited: A Critical Reassessment of Evolutionary Arguments against Truth, doi:10.1007/s10699-025-10018-z, Sections 1-5, ext 101

Where it hits

OF1

Where Cor stands

What Cor needs from OF1 is modest: perception is not guaranteed to be accurate, so a feeling is read as information about state, never as a direct report of the world. That much has wide support. The research programme states the claim much more strongly, as Hoffman's interface principle ("never a direct window onto reality"), and that strong version is contested, as this record shows.

What would settle it

Proposal only: state hard-core claim 1 at the strength Cor uses (not guaranteed accurate) and leave the Hoffman version as one supporting view.

On record in Cor: Falsifier 4 on the research programme page.

OBJ-22 Mismatch explains everything

Verdict: Partly answered

The attack

If every form of distress can be read as a correct signal from a mismatched setting, the account explains everything and so explains nothing. Maung presses the alternatives such a reading must rule out: by-products of evolved structures and products of development in modern settings (Maung HH 2024, ext 1078).

"Therefore, the data are just as consistent with mental disorders being adaptively neutral byproducts of evolved structures or ontogenetic products of modern environmental conditions. The ontogenetic hypothesis may even be more plausible and easier to test than evolutionary adaptive explanations, because nongenetic factors can produce observable changes on much shorter time scales than genetic factors."

Where it hits

DA1 OF2 P3

Where Cor stands

Cor states limits: a measurable physical cause displaces the signal reading, as do substance effects, developmental miscalibration and self-maintaining loops (OF2). It treats addiction neuroscience as a genuine challenge and lists results that would refute it. It holds challenges to its own scope, such as the case that the mismatch reading fits only a small share of drug use (Sullivan RJ and Hagen EH 2002, ext 901).

The site's own copy undercuts this. The FAQ's answer on the core idea says modern human suffering is "in most cases" accurate signaling, a broad claim Cor's own wording rules forbid; scope should be stated by naming the mechanism. The by-product and developmental alternatives are not ruled out for any disorder (see OBJ-01).

What would settle it

A published list of cases where the mismatch reading predicts wrongly, kept next to the cases where it predicts right. Proposal only: rewrite the FAQ's core-idea answer to state the claim as a conditional on the mechanism.

OBJ-23 Most mechanisms are not forced by the evidence, and two convergences hang free

Verdict: Conceded

The attack

Cor presents a pyramid from frame to mechanisms, but the evidence forces only a minority of the mechanisms, and two convergences have no foundational parent. The derivation story claims more structure than the database holds.

Where it hits

C11 C14 M11 M14

Where Cor stands

True, and stated on the derivation page and in the gap register. Five of fifteen mechanisms are forced by a convergence (M1, M2, M3, M11, M14); the other ten are associated with converging evidence. C11 and C14 are left open by design rather than attached to the nearest plausible parent.

What would settle it

Convergence rows that meet the three-independent-literatures rule for more mechanisms, as G10 plans for controllability, circadian timing and contamination avoidance.

On record in Cor: G10.